We develop a cut-free (and hence analytic) nested sequent calculus for a modal logic of actions and propositions. The actions act on propositions via a dynamic modality (the weakest precondition of program logics), whose left adjoint we refer to as 'update' (the strongest postcondition). Both logics are positive and have adjoint pairs of epistemic modalities: the left adjoints express agents' uncertainties and the right adjoints express their beliefs. The rules for 'update' encode learning as a result of discarding uncertainty. We prove admissibility of Cut, and hence the completeness of the logic w.r.t. an algebraic semantics. We interpret the logic on epistemic scenarios with honest and dishonest communication actions, add assumption rules to encode them and prove that the extended calculus still has the admissibility results. We apply the calculus to encode and solve the classic epistemic puzzle of muddy children and a modern version of it with dishonest agents.
Introduction
Temporal and epistemic logics can express properties of programs [10] and distributed system protocols [7] . The modalities of epistemic logics encode attitudes such as knowledge and belief, but dynamic changes to these attitudes, e.g. after announcements, have traditionally been formalised only in a semantic fashion. Dynamic program logics are, on the other hand, developed for the specific purpose of syntactic reasoning about changes of properties. Adding epistemic modalities to dynamic logics led to logics [3, 4] allowing reasoning about belief updates, both syntactically and semantically. But, lacking cut-admissibility, the calculus proposed in [3] is not a basis for automatic proof search. Here we develop a cut-free sequent calculus as basis for a proof search procedure for one such logic. The calculus is nested, in the sense of calculi studied in, e.g., [5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18] .
The logic from [3] comprises a linear logic of actions Q and a logic of propositions M . The former act on the latter via modalities, similar to the dynamic modality of PDL, known there as the weakest precondition, and its right adjoint, the strongest postcondition. We develop an algebraic semantics for these logics in terms of a residuated lattice-monoid of actions and its right lattice of propositions; their completions are referred to as "quantale-module pairs" and their application to program semantics has been studied in [1] . We endow both M and Q with families of epistemic adjoint operators. We present sequent calculi for the logics, such that the logic of actions admits a cut rule and that the logic of propositions admits two cut rules (and weakening and contraction rules). The calculi are thus complete w.r.t. the algebraic semantics. Finally, after [3] , we interpret the actions Q as announcements (public or private, honest or dishonest), the operations of Q on M as the effects of the actions on propositions, the epistemic modalities in terms of agents' uncertainties and beliefs, and distributivity properties involving the dynamic modalities in terms of properties of belief update procedures. We add rules to allow encoding of epistemic scenarios and show that the admissibility results are unaffected. We apply this to encode the classic epistemic scenario of muddy children and new versions of it with dishonest agents. The calculus (with some optimisations) and some example scenarios are implemented in [19] .
The sequent calculus of actions and adjoint modalities enriches the calculus of [12] with the two classical operators of ∨ and ∧. The rules for the logic of propositions include those of [17] , together with new rules for the dynamic modalities, their distributivity interactions with epistemic modalities, and rules for action connectives in propositional contexts. The admissibility theorems are novel contributions. The algebraic semantics is a finite version of [3] ; our formalisation allows for a completeness proof without lattice completions. Proving admissibility of the cut rules involves hundreds of cases, some already considered in [17] . Our solution of the muddy children puzzle is new; it does not rely on negation or the fix point operator of common knowledge, e.g. that in [10] . The sequent proof offers a unified method of solving such puzzles and is a major improvement on the inductive algebraic proof in [3] .
Detailed proofs are available in a long version available from the authors.
Syntax, Algebra and Semantics for Actions
We give here the syntax and the intended algebraic semantics of our action logic; in Section 3 we present a cut-free sequent calculus. In Sections 4 and 5 we add the syntax, an algebraic semantics and a sequent calculus for propositions, including those formed by the interaction of actions and propositions. In Section 6 we give a soundness and completeness theorem.
Syntax and Algebra of Actions
The set Q of actions q of the action logic is generated over a set A of agents A and a set B of basic actions σ by the following grammar:
The binary connectives ∧ and ∨ will be interpreted as lattice operations of meet and join, with and ⊥ as their units; • is a monoid multiplication with 1 as its unit, the modalities 2 A and A will be adjoint endo-operators on the lattice monoid. We make this more precise as follows: Thus, in addition to the lattice axioms, the following hold, for all q, q , q ∈ Q and all A ∈ A:
Proposition 2.2 In any LMAM Q over A, the following hold:
Definition 2.3 An LMAM Q over A is multiplicative iff we have the following:
Proposition 2.4
In any multiplicative LMAM Q over A, the following hold:
The qs are for interpretation of epistemic actions, such as announcements, which may change belief, and ≤ is the information order; hence ∨ is non-deterministic choice and ⊥ is failure, • is sequential composition and 1 is skip (the null action),
A q is the "uncertainty" of agent A about action q and 2 A q is the agent's belief about it. As argued in [3] , these epistemic operators allow encoding of various types of announcements such as public and private. Inequality (16) encodes a form of belief update, that the uncertainty about a composite action is derived from the composition of the uncertainties of the component actions.
Semantics of Actions
Let Q be a multiplicative LMAM over A. An interpretation in Q of the action logic 
Note that we use Q both for the set of actions of the logic and for the LMAM interpreting them; the context will always make clear which is intended.
Sequent Calculus for Actions

Preliminaries
We have action items T and action contexts Θ generated by the following syntax:
where Θ A will be interpreted as A ( Θ), for Θ the sequential composition of the interpretations of elements in the list Θ. The use of lists rather than sets or multi-sets reflects the non-commutativity (and non-idempotence) of the composition of actions.
Thus, action contexts (abbreviated to a-contexts) are finite lists of action items, where action items (abbreviated to a-items) are either actions or agent-annotated action contexts. The term context is not in the sense of "having a gap waiting to be filled" but as a short name for the antecedent of a sequent, i.e. the context in which the succedent action is performed (or, when we discuss propositions, asserted). If one of the a-items inside an a-context is replaced by a "hole" [ ], we have an a-context with an a-hole. More precisely, we have the notions of an a-context-with-an-a-hole Σ and an a-item-with-an-a-hole R, defined using mutual recursion as follows:
Given an a-context-with-an-a-hole Σ and an a-context Θ, the result Σ[Θ] of applying the first to the second, i.e. replacing the hole [ ] in Σ by Θ, is an a-context, defined recursively (together with the application of an a-item-with-an-a-hole R to an a-context, to form an a-context) as follows:
This notion of "context with a hole" allows, in the expression of the inference rules, a precise notation for replacement deep inside contexts. For example, with
Given a-contexts-with-an-a-hole Σ , Σ, and an a-item-with-an-a-hole R, the combinations Σ • Σ and R • Σ are defined to be a-contexts with a-holes, as follows, by mutual recursion on the structures of Σ and R:
Sequents and their Interpretations
[Action] sequents consist of an a-context Θ (on the left), a turnstile and an action q (on the right). We omit the list constructors, e.g. we write 1, σ, ⊥ σ rather than 1, σ, ⊥ σ ; the empty list is often omitted. The meanings of a-items and of a-contexts, given an interpretation, are obtained by mutual induction on their structure:
; it is true in Q iff true in all interpretations in Q; it is valid iff true in every multiplicative LMAM. When checking validity of the rules, we use the easy fact that if Θ ≤ Θ then
Sequent Calculus
We have the following initial sequents (in which σ is restricted to being a basic action, i.e. is from B):
The rules for the lattice operations, composition and the modalities are:
We also have structural rules, i.e. rules not involving the algebraic operators:
The two indicated occurrences of σ in the Id rule are principal. Each right rule has its conclusion's succedent as its principal action (but we will always just call it a principal formula); in addition, the A R rule has Θ A as a principal item. Each left rule has a principal item: these are as usual.
The size of an action q is just the (weighted) number of operator occurrences, counting each operator A and 2 A as having weight 2; the size of an a-item Θ A is the size of Θ plus 1, and the size of an a-context Θ is the sum of the sizes of its items. The size of a sequent Θ q is just the sum of the sizes of Θ and q. Note that each premiss of a rule instance has lower size than the conclusion, except for the rule Dist, whose presence leads to non-termination of a naive implementation of the calculus.
Lemma 3.1 For every action q, the sequent q q is derivable.
Following this, in proofs and examples below, we shall allow the use of Id in the formeven where the action q is not a basic action. 
As an example of a derivation, we show that a sequence of A operations preserves composition and conjunction in one direction:
Admissibility of Cut
Theorem 3.4 The Cut rule is admissible
Proof. Strong induction on the rank of the cut, where the rank is given by the pair (size of cut formula q, sum of heights of derivations of premisses). Full details are in the appendix of the long version. 2
Syntax and Algebra for Propositions
Syntax of propositions
Given sets A of agents A and B of basic actions σ, we have as above an action logic with a set Q of actions q. Now let At be a set of (propositional) atoms p; the set M of propositions m is generated by the following grammar:
The last two binary connectives are mixed action-proposition connectives: the operator [q] is the dynamic modality operator, with [q]m read as "after action q, proposition m holds"; · q is its left adjoint, called update, with m · q read as "proposition m is updated by action q". The difference is like that in ordinary logic between a → b and b ∧ a. A is the left adjoint of 2 A : the former expresses the uncertainty of an agent about a proposition, and the latter expresses his belief; 2 A m is read as "A believes that m". 
Algebraic semantics for propositions
For a detailed list of derived properties of a DLAM, see [17] . 
Sequent Calculus for Propositions
Preliminaries
As in the action logic, we have propositional contexts Γ and propositional items I (abbreviated to p-contexts and p-items), generated by the following grammar:
The union of two multi-sets is indicated by a comma, as in Γ, Γ or (treating an item I as a one element multiset) as in Γ, I. A p-item I can be either a proposition or an agent-annotated p-context, as in [17] ; but it can also be a p-context Γ annotated by an a-context Θ.
To express the rules correctly, we need, as in Section 3, some notion of p-context (or item) with a hole. There are now two kinds of hole, one for propositions and one for actions,
both represented by [ ]; we use the notations Δ for a p-context-witha-p-hole, J for a p-item-with-a-p-hole, Λ for a p-context-with-an-a-hole and K for a
p-item-with-an-a-hole, defined, using mutual recursion, as follows:
in which we recall from Section 3 that Σ indicates an a-context-with-an-a-hole. Various applications of something with an appropriate hole to p-contexts and pitems and combinations of these can be defined in a way similar to that presented in the action calculus.
Sequents for Propositions and their Interpretations
Our second sequent calculus (see Sub-section 5.3) allows reasoning about relationships between propositions. Sequents are now of the form Γ m. Given the meanings of action items and contexts in a multiplicative LMAM Q as defined above, and with the obvious notion of an interpretation of atomic propositions in a DLAM acted on by Q, extended as in Section 4.2 to compound propositions, the meanings of p-items and of p-contexts are obtained by mutual induction on their structure:
; it is true in M iff true in all interpretations in M , and it is valid iff true in every DLAM M over any multiplicative LMAM Q. That the initial sequents of the following calculus are valid and that the rules preserve truth are proved using ideas familiar from the action calculus:
Sequent Calculus
We have the following initial sequents (in which p is restricted to being an atom, i.e. in At):
The rules for the lattice operations and the modal operators are:
The rules for the dynamic operations are:
The structural rules are, with Γ in the first two to ensure admissibility of W k:
As in the action logic, the two indicated occurrences of p in the Id rule are principal and each right rule has its conclusion's succedent as its principal formula. But in addition, the A R rule has Γ A as its principal item and Γ (which is there to ensure admissibility of Wk) as its parameter. Similarly, the ·R rule has Γ Θ as its principal item and Γ as its parameter. [More detailed definitions of such matters are in the long version.] We also include all the four kinds of initial sequent and all the fifteen rules of the action logic, and all the variants of the L rules (including ⊥L, Dist and Unit) of the action logic obtained by replacing any Σ by Λ and the succedent action q by a proposition m. These rules are ⊥L, 1L, ∧L, ∨L, •L, L , 2L, Dist and Unit; we thus obtain propositional variants:
The next four lemmas are provable by routine methods:
Lemma 5.1 All sequents Γ, m m are derivable.
Lemma 5.2
The following Weakening and Contraction rules are admissible:
Lemma 5.3 The rules ∧L, ∨L, A L, 2 A L, ·L, ∧R, 2 A R and DyR are invertible.
Lemma 5.4
The rules ⊥R − and L − are admissible:
Admissibility of DyCut and PrCut
Theorem 5.5
The following DyCut and PrCut rules are admissible:
Proof. Strong induction on the rank of the cut, where the rank is given by the pair: (size of cut formula m, sum of heights of derivations of premisses). Full details are in the long version. 2 Proof. First, we show that the initial sequents of the sequent calculus of actions are valid and that the rules are truth-preserving. For the converse, we follow the Lindenbaum-Tarski proof method. As usual, cut-admissibility is essential for showing transitivity of . Similar methods are followed for the calculus of propositions. Full details are in the long version. 2
Main Result
Interpretation and Assumption Rules
The interpretations of propositional and action connectives are as usual [1] : ∧, ∨ for conjunction and disjunction on propositions and non-deterministic choice and parallel composition for actions, • (⊗ of linear logic) is the sequential composition of actions, 1 is the skip action. The dynamic connectives [q]m and m·q are the weakest precondition and strongest postcondition, with interpretations as explained above in Subsection 4.1. As for the epistemic modalities, A expresses the appearance to agent A of, or uncertainty of agent A about, a proposition (or an action), and 2 A expresses the belief of agent A about a proposition (or an action). The uncertainties are all the propositions (or actions) that appear to A as true (or as happening in case of actions) when the proposition m is indeed true (or the action q is indeed happening). In a relational semantics, these assumptions are given by the accessibility relation, e.g. that a state (or action) can access certain other states (or actions). In the case of actions, these enable us to express honest and dishonest public and private announcements. The Dist and DyDist rules allow for the uncertainty of a proposition updated by a composition of actions to be decomposed to the uncertainties of the actions and the uncertainties of the proposition. A belief after a sequential composition of actions can thus be derived from the belief before it.
Each epistemic scenario has assumptions about the basic actions and atomic propositions involved in the scenario. These are represented algebraically in [3] and we present them proof theoretically here. First, not every action is applicable to every proposition; we can represent the assumption, that a basic action σ is inapplicable when a proposition k holds, by the rule Ker (σ,k) . Second, the facts of the world (i.e. atomic propositions p) are stable under basic actions such as announcements; so if a propositional atom p is true before a basic action σ, it will stay true after it; this is represented by the rule Stab (p,σ) . Finally, each agent A has some uncertainty about each atomic proposition p (or basic action σ). So we have one or more assumptions of the form "appearance to agent A of atomic proposition p is proposition n" and "appearance to agent A of basic action σ is the action w", represented by P rApp (A,p,n) and App (A,σ,w) respectively: 
Application
A well-known epistemic scenario is that of the muddy children, as follows: n children are playing in the mud and k of them have muddy foreheads. Each child can see the other children's foreheads, but cannot see his own. Father announces to them "At least one of you has a muddy forehead." and then asks "Do you know it is you who has a muddy forehead?". After k − 1 rounds of honest "no" answers by all the children, the muddy ones infer that they are muddy. We can also reason about variants with dishonesty. For instance, if the father falsely announces that at least one child is muddy, then all the children will wrongly believe that they are muddy. Or the muddy children are liars and after k − 1 honest answers they lie that they do not know that they are muddy; the clean children then wrongly infer that they are muddy. For a formalization of the honest version, assume the children are enumerated and the first k are muddy. Consider the propositional atoms D i for "child i is muddy" and C i for "child i is clean". Since the actions of this scenario are all epistemic, these propositional atoms are stable under all basic actions. Child i can see the other children's foreheads: we capture this by P rApp (i,D j ,D j ) and P rApp (i,C j ,C j ) for i = j. But he cannot see his own, so he is uncertain about himself being muddy or not, captured by P rApp ( 
. We denote father's initial announcement by basic action σ and children's "no" replies by basic action σ . These actions are honest public announcements, so their appearance to any child i is identity, captured by App (i,σ,σ) and App (i,σ ,σ ) . Father's initial announcement cannot happen when there is no muddy child, and children's "no" replies cannot happen if any of them knows that he is muddy: these are captured by
, respectively. Fig. 1 presents the proof tree for n = 3, k = 2 for the proposition that, after father's announcement and one round of "no" answers, a muddy child j = 1 knows that he is muddy. Consider the first dishonest variant of the puzzle; we denote father's lying action by the basic action σ, which appears (in the honest version of the puzzle) to a child i as his honest announcement σ; this is captured by the assumption rule App(i, σ, σ). The action σ cannot happen when a child is muddy; this is captured by the assumption rule Ker(σ, ∨ i D i ). Figure 2 presents the proof of the proposition that, when no child is muddy and after father's lie that at least one child is muddy, child i = 2 believes that he is muddy. Assumption rule instances and the proof tree for the second dishonest variant are presented in the appendix of the long version.
Our calculus allows a proof procedure close to human reasoning. In Figure 1 , the lowest four steps ∧L, DyR, •L and 2 1 R rewrite the original statement into a normal form. Then DyDist and Dist apply the belief update procedure and decompose the uncertainty of child 1 about the updated proposition to the update of his propositional uncertainty by his action uncertainty. The forking rule ∨L Fig. 1 . Proof tree for the honest muddy children puzzle.
App (2,σ,σ) Fig. 2 . Proof tree for the lying-father variant of the muddy children puzzle.
creates a case analysis for child 2: the left branch is the real world, and the right branch is when he is the only muddy child (but the applications of Ker show that this option is impossible). A similar pattern is followed in the second proof, where, at the forking rule, child 2's possibilities are that either he is muddy, or that he is clean, but, since he has heard the announcement that at least one child is muddy, the case with no muddy children is impossible.
Decidability and Complexity
Our sequent calculus has a weak form of the sub-formula property (of a kind studied in [6] ) adequate to allow the calculi to be called "analytic"; proof search is therefore effective (even if not efficient) and decidability is routine (since there are none of the issues from first-order logic of choosing terms). A proof search procedure has been implemented in [19] using a loop-checking technique and variations of the Bounded Depth-First tree expansion strategy. These all have a polynomial space complexity (n log n), but the worst case time complexity of our optimal terminating strategy is O(b d ) for b the branching factor and d the depth of the shortest proof.
Summary and future work
Our nested sequent calculus, for a positive logic of propositions and actions with adjoint epistemic and dynamic modalities, admits cut, and is sound and complete with regard to an algebraic semantics inspired by [1, 3] . With added assumption rules) the calculus is applicable to reasoning about dynamic epistemic scenarios. Existing proof theoretic treatments of dynamic epistemic logics, e.g. [2, 13] , only consider specific actions of public announcements. The only other calculus [3] that allows for arbitrary announcements (public/private, honest/dishonest) lacks cut-admissibility. Our work shows that dynamic epistemic logics can be represented in terms of a cutfree sequent calculus, albeit one with rules admitting substantial non-determinism in root-first proof search. The implementation [19] of this sequent calculus provides an automated tool for encoding scenarios involving both epistemic operators and actions. Refinements of the calculus, addressing issues such as termination and backtracking, are yet to be developed.
